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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT G. SLUSHERf JR., 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
KENNETH W. BROOKS, TODD PAUL 
OSPITAL, by his personal 
representative, and CURTIS 
CAMPBELL, 
Defendants, Respondents, 
and Appellants. 
Case No. 19660 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT OSPITAL 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought against defendants for 
personal injury damages arising from an automobile accident. 
Defendant Ospital cross-claimed against defendant Campbell 
for wrongful death and Campbell cross-claimed against 
Ospital for contribution. Early in the case, defendant 
Brooks was dismissed as having no involvement in or lia-
bility from the accident. Prior to trial, plaintiff settled 
his claim against Ospital and trial proceeded on plaintiff's 
claim and Ospitalfs cross-claim against Campbell. 
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DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT 
The jury returned a verdict finding Campbell one 
hundred percent responsible on both plaintiff's claim and 
Ospital's cross-claim. Pursuant to the jury's verdict the 
court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff for $200,000 
and in favor of Ospital for $50f849. Plaintiff's judgment 
of $200,000 was reduced by $65,000, the amount of plain-
tiff's settlement with Ospital and $2,000, the amount of no 
fault benefits received. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-respondent Ospital seeks affirmation of 
the lower court's judgment in his favor. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant's Statement of Facts contains only those 
facts which most strongly support appellant's position. To 
avoid the misunderstanding that may occur from one-sided and 
incomplete facts, it is necessary to state the facts 
undisclosed by appellant. 
This case arises from an automobile accident in 
Sardine Canyon, Cache County, Utah. Defendant Campbell was 
attempting to pass the plaintiff and five other vehicles on 
a two lane road in a flat area at the bottom of a small 
valley known as the Dry Lake Area of Sardine Canyon. 
- 2 -
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According to eye witnesses who were being passed by 
Campbell, Campbell's passing speed was from 70 to 80 miles 
per hour" (witness Zucca R. Tr. 179; witness Michael Gerber 
R. Tr. 290) Plaintiff estimated Campbell's passing speed 
at 65 to 70 miles per hour. (R. Tr. 143) 
As Campbell was passing he began ascending the hill 
on the north side of the valley, where there was a no-
passing zone ahead. (R. Ex 83-C) At the same time, Ospital 
was approaching in the opposite direction, coming down the 
hill. In order to avoid a head-on collision with Campbell, 
Ospital attempted to swerve around Campbell but lost control 
of his vehicle (R. Tr. 286-295) Once Ospital began 
skidding by swerving to the right, there was nothing Ospital 
could have done to regain control before the collision with 
plaintiff. (R. Tr. 563-4) 
Gerber, the driver of one of the cars being passed 
by Campbell, witnessed the events leading to the accident. 
He saw Campbell passing numerous vehicle behind him and as 
he began ascending the hill he saw Ospital approaching in 
the opposite direction. He testified that when Ospital and 
Campbell passed each other, Ospital had swerved on to the 
shoulder of the road to miss Campbell. Thereafter, Campbell 
remained in Ospital's lane of traffic and continued passing 
the rest of the northbound vehicles. (R. Tr. 291-298) 
Gerber observed that Ospital did not appear to have lost 
- 3 -
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control of his vehicle until after swerving to avoid 
Campbell. (R. Tr. 295) His estimate of Ospital's speed 
was 55 to 60 miles per hour (R. Tr. 296) Gerber did not 
attribute any fault of the accident to Ospital. 
Mr. Gerber was not present at the trial and his 
deposition was read to the jury. His deposition was taken 
on June 15f 1982, approximately one year before any settle-
ment between plaintiff and Ospital. (R. Depos. Gerber). 
Other than the parties, Gerber was the only eye witness who 
saw both Campbell and Ospital approach and pass each other. 
Appellant asserts that there is strong evidence of 
a vehicle other than Campbell's that was passing and caused 
Ospital to lose control. There is no substantial evidence 
to support appellant's assertion. Every witness, including 
Campbell, testified that there was no other vehicle passing 
at the time in question. (R. Tr. 144, 181, 315, 632, and 
634) Even Campbell's initial description of the events 
immediately before the accident, is consistent with the 
jury's finding of Campbell's interference with Ospital's 
vehicle: 
...as I passed it (a truck) I noticed 
coming up on top of the hill a car came 
into view, and I proceeded to pass, and 
as I did I noticed that the closing rate 
between the car coming down the hill and 
I was greater than I had expected, and I 
continued to pass, but I crowded back 
in." (R. Tr. 425) 
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The investigating officer, Kent Parker, also 
concluded that by passing, Campbell was involved in the 
accident and interred with Ospital's driving, (R. Tr. 711 
and 716) 
At the time of trial, Reynold K. Watkins, an expert 
witness called by Ospital, testified concerning Ospital's 
speed. Watkins is a professor of engineering at Utah State 
University and has received his bachelors, masters and doc-
tors degree in engineering. He has been involved in acci-
dent reconstruction since 1957. He has taught accident 
reconstruction and his pupils included Robert Dahle, 
Campbell's expert witness. (R. Tr. 800) Watkins concluded 
after extensive investigation that at the time Ospital sud-
denly swerved to his right, his maximum speed would have 
been 57 miles per hour and minimum speed 41 miles per hour, 
with the likelihood between 45 and 50 miles per hour. (R. 
Tr. 566-568) Watkins explained how Trooper Dahle 
(Campbell's expert) had erred in reaching his opinion of 
Ospital's speed. (R. Tr. 840-851, and 868-871) 
Dahle had no engineering degree, and in addition to 
his patrol duty, he farmed approximately 300 acres and some-
times consulted on the side as an accident reconstruc-
tionist. (R. Tr. 799) The testimony of the experts at 
trial lasted more than a day, including numerous cross-
examinations by all parties and rebuttal testimony. There 
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were numerous exhibits offered by both experts. 
As a result of the accident, plaintiff received 
severe injuries including several broken ribs, punctured 
lung, broken nose, numerous broken teeth, a substantial por-
tion of muscle and flesh in the left arm were torn out and 
lost, radial nerve severed, broken knee, torn ligaments in 
knee and foot, and numerous lacerations and abrasions. As a 
result of these injuries, plaintiff incurred approximately 
$23,500 in medical expenses. He has permanently lost 
substantial use of his left arm, hand, right knee and foot 
and there is extensive disfigurement and scarring, (R. Tr. 
117-127) 
Ospital, one of only two children in his family, 
was killed. He was 19 years old and on academic scholarship 
at Utah State at the time of his death. He was an 
outstanding young man, with a list of achievements and cre-
dentials, including Sterling Scholar, All-state basketball 
guard, grade point average of 3.96, pre-med student, and had 
received numerous trophies and awards for outstanding 
achievement in the community. His parents had a very spe-
cial and close relationship with their son and he was a 
source of great comfort and joy. (R. Tr. 673-695) 
On April 27, 1983, (approximately five months 
before trial) counsel for Ospital wrote to counsel for 
Campbell suggesting that they jointly attempt settlement of 
- 6 -
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plaintiff's claim. (R. Bk. Ill, 251-2) Campbell was speci-
fically informed at that time that if he failed to settle, 
Ospital would proceed to negotiate a separate settlement 
with plaintiff. The two counsel met shortly thereafter and 
counsel for Campbell informed counsel for Ospital that he 
was not interested in contributing anything toward settle-
ment. Counsel for Ospital then reiterated that he would 
proceed to negotiate directly with the plaintiff. (R. Bk. 
Ill, 231) 
Despite his knowledge of Ospital's intentions to 
settle, Campbell made no attempt to seek discovery—either 
formally or informally—of the settlement agreement until 
the Friday before trial when counsel for Campbell telephoned 
counsel for Ospital and was fully informed of the settlement 
and its terms. (R. Bk. Ill, 231-2) 
On the morning of the trial, the court was informed 
of the settlement, and Campbell presented his arguments that 
the agreement was prejudicial and moved the court to bifur-
cate the trial or to introduce evidence of the settlement. 
(HP. 1-11, 15-7). The trial court ruled that the case should 
go forward on its pleadings and that evidence of the settle-
ment be excluded. (T. 25-6) However, in order to protect 
against possible prejudice, counsel stipulated that Ospital 
would not lead plaintiff's witnesses on cross-examination. 
(T. 18). Moreover, during trial and in closing argument, 
- 7
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Campbell was allowed to argue that plaintiff and Ospital 
were acting as alligned parties and to suggest that they had 
an agreement to help each other out. (T. 923-4). 
ARGUMENT 
> 
POINT I: THE NON DISCLOSURE TO THE JURY OF THE 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
PLAINTIFF AND OSPITAL DID NOT PREJUDICE 
CAMPBELL NOR DENY HIM A FAIR TRIAL 
Campbell broadly alleges on this appeal that he 
was prejudiced and denied a fair trial because of the non-
disclosure to the jury of settlement between plaintiff and 
Ospital. Relying on cases involving settlement agreements 
commonly referred to as "Mary Carter agreements", he asserts 
that the trial court committed prejudicial error in not 
bifurcating the trial or introducing evidence of settlement. 
Campbell's cited cases are entirely inappositef however, 
because the settlement agreement in this case was not a Mary 
Carter agreement or even similar to one. Moreoverf trial 
was conducted in a manner to avoid any possible prejudice to 
Campbell resulting from the settlement agreement. 
A. The Settlement Between Plaintiff and Defendant 
Ospital does Not Constitute a "Mary Carter Agreement." 
"Mary Carter agreement" is the term commonly used 
to refer to settlement agreements between the plaintiff and 
one or more—but not all—of the defendants, with the 
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distinguishing feature that the settling defendant agrees to 
pay the plaintiff a certain amount with the understanding 
that the amount will be reduced or extinguished by any reco-
very the plaintiff acquires from the non-settling defendant. 
In order to further its purposef the agreement is kept se-
cret from the other parties and the settling defendant 
remains a party at trial where he actively works to aid the 
plaintiff's case. See, e.g., Cox v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 594 
P.2d 354 (Okla. 1978); Vermont Union School District No. 21 
v. H.P. Cummings Construction Co., 469 A.2d 742 (Vt. 1933). 
As this description makes clear, the settlement 
agreement reached in this case is not a Mary Carter 
agreement. (A copy of the applicable settlement agreement 
is provided at the end of this brief for reference.) The 
settlement agreement here provided simply that Ospital would 
pay plaintiff $65,000 and in return receive a release of all 
claims. Plaintiff further agreed to reduce any judgment 
against Campbell by the settlement amount. (R. Bk. Ill, 
21-3). Ospital retained ho right to recover back any por-
tion of a judgment against Campbell nor was there any 
agreement of Ospital to secretly aid the plaintiff as a con-
dition of the settlement. Thus the most objectionable ele-
ments of a Mary Carter agreement were absent in this case. 
The trial court and Campbell were fully aware of 
the existence of the agreement at the time, of trial. The 
- 9 -
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trial court, after hearing and considering Campbell's 
motions for bifurcation or admission of the settlement into 
evidence, exercised its discretion to deny those motions and 
provided certain safeguards to prevent prejudice to Campbell 
and avoid prejudice to plaintiff and Ospital. This 
situation was entirely different from that typical of Mary 
Carter agreements, where the agreement is kept secret until 
the plaintiff dismisses the settling defendant at the close 
of the evidence but before the jury deliberations. See, 
e.g., Lum v. Stinnett, 87 Nev. 402, 488 P.2d 347 (1971). 
Campbell complains that he was not told of the 
agreement until shortly before trial and implies that the 
settling parties had a duty to disclose the agreement. 
There is no authority proffered for this position. This 
court has held that a party has a duty to disclose infor-
mation only when it is requested in conformity with the 
rules of procedure. Transamerica Title Insurance Co. v. 
United Resources, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 346, 471 P.2d 165 (1970) 
In any event, approximately 5 months before trial, 
Ospital had informed Campbell that he would attempt a 
separate settlement with plaintiff because Campbell did not 
wish to participate. Yet at no time did Campbell seek for-
mal or informal discovery of the settlement agreement. 
Under these circumstances, he should not now be heard to 
complain of any alleged prejudice resulting from his own 
- 10 -
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failure to discover the settlement of which he had prior 
notice. 
Moreover, even if this were a Mary Carter agreement 
(which it clearly was not) , Campbell had a duty to seek 
discovery of the agreement. In Grille v. Burke's Paint Co., 
551 P. 2d 449 (Or. 1976), the non-settling defendant argued 
he was entitled to a new trial on the ground that he was. 
not aware of the Mary Carter agreement prior to trial. The 
court rejected that argument by making the following obser-
vation: 
However, du Pont made no effort to discover 
the existence or the terms of the agreement 
despite the fact that it had been repeatedly 
informed by Burkefs that it intended to 
settle with plaintiff. Du Pont may not have 
actually known of the particular kind of 
settlement which was contemplated, but, 
under the circumstances of this case, du 
Pont should have been aware that Burke's was 
attempting to protect itself from any and 
all adverse consequences of this action. 
551 P.2d at 453. 
See also Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1973) (Mary 
Carter agreement must be produced when requested under 
appropriate rules of procedure) . 
- 11 -
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B. The Adversary Nature And Integrity Of The 
Trial Was Protected By The Existence Of Ospital's 
Cross-Claim Against Campbell And The Trial Court's 
Conducting Of The Trial. 
Despite the clear fact that this was not a Mary 
Carter agreement, Campbell nonetheless argues that the 
agreement was analogous to a Mary Carter agreement and was 
thus prejudicial to him. Specifically, he charges that the 
adversary nature of the trial was undermined because Ospital 
was allowed to remain at trial when he had already settled 
with plaintiff. 
The most prejudicial aspect of the Mary Carter 
agreement is that because of the settling defendant's secret 
financial interest in the plaintiff's claim, he can remain 
in trial and covertly aid the plaintiff. In those cases, 
the settling defendant may abandon defenses earlier pleaded 
that were adverse to the plaintiff's case, openly admit that 
none of the defendants have a meritorious defense, or admit 
that the plaintiff's claimed damages are reasonable. When 
these admissions come from a defendant who has no claim of 
his own against a non-settling defendant and ostensibly is 
at trial solely to defend against the plaintiff's claim, the 
jury is left with no explanation for such "candor" and is 
left to conclude that the plaintiff's claim is valid and the 
non-settling defendant is only stubbornly and unreasonably 
resisting it. See, generally, Lum v. Stinnett, supra; 
- 12 -
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Annot. 65 A.L.R. 3d 602 (1975). 
It is further argued that the non-settling defen-
dant in a Mary Carter case is also prejudiced by the 
settling parties1 advantageous use of procedural devices. 
The settling defendant, as an adverse party, is free to lead 
the plaintiff's witnesses on ostensible cross-examination 
and fillB in gaps left by the plaintiff in direct examina-
tion. Lum v Stinnett, supra, is an excellent example of 
such prejudicial effects of a Mary Carter agreement. There, 
the settling defendants reserved their opening statement, 
thus forcing the nonsettling defendant to do the same or be 
left with no way to rebut the later argument of his 
"co-defendants." The settling defendants were allowed, over 
objection, to lead the plaintiff's "adverse" witnesses at 
will, and then successfully object to further cross-
examination by the non-settling defendant. 
The proceedings in the present case stand in sharp 
contrast to such practices. It is true that Ospital 
vigorously attempted to prove Campbell solely responsible 
for the accident. However, Ospital's interest was not 
because of the settlement with plaintiff but was due to his 
cross-claim for wrongful death, which would have been 
pursued in the same manner even if settlement had not been 
reached with plaintiff. The jury knew of Ospital's cross-
claim from the beginning and was thus in a position to pro-
- 13 -
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perly evaluate and weigh the credibility of Ospital's 
evidence. Campbell was free to argue any bias of-Ospital's 
position. Indeed, trial was conducted in essentially the 
same manner it would have been had plaintiff and Ospital 
initially joined their claims as co-plaintiffs, which is 
explicitly authorized by Rule 20, Utah R.Civ.P. 
Moreover, Ospital gained no procedural advantage 
because of the settlement. To avoid prejudice to Campbell, 
the trial court ruled that the two settling parties would 
not be allowed to lead each other's witnesses on cross-
examination. Since the court was fully aware of the settle-
ment and the arguments as to possible prejudice, it was in a 
position to closely monitor the proceedings. Following 
trial, the court explicitly considered this problem in its 
memorandum decision and stated: 
As to any collusion, this court was present 
and observed the whole trial, observed no 
collusion between attorneys for Ospital and 
Slusher. In fact, Counsel for Slusher 
questioned all witnesses of both Campbell and 
Ospital as though adversary to his position 
that Slusher was not negligent, had no liabi-
lity, and that he didn't know who was liable 
but it had to be one or other defendant or 
both. (R. Bk. IV. 46). 
In both his opening statement, (T.82), and closing argument, 
(T.886), counsel for Slusher stated that his position was 
merely that Ospital or Campbell, or both, were responsible 
for plaintiff's injuries. 
- 14 -
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Campbell repeatedly points to Newell Knightfs 
testimony as an example of prejudice. An examination of 
Knightfs testimony reveals no such prejudice. On direct 
examination plaintiff elicited from Knight merely that "the 
gray car would have been a factor" in causing the accident 
(T. 374). Contrary to Campbell's assertions, this testi-
mony was designed to rebut Campbell's contention that he was 
not negligent and it was clearly consistent with the plain-
tiff's claim that one or both of the defendants were respon-
sible. At no time did Knight ever testify that Ospital was 
not negligent or had nothing to do with the cause of the 
accident. 
Plaintiff did not question Knight as to the speed 
of Ospital's car or attempt to prove that Ospital was not 
speeding. In fact, Knight admitted that he did not have an 
opinion of Ospital's exact speed. His testimony on cross-
examination by Ospital was merely that Ospital could not be 
traveling as fast as Campbell claimed he was. (T. 386). 
The critical testimony in establishing Ospital's speed was 
given by Reynold Watkins, (T. 565-9), an expert witness 
retained and called by Ospital. 
C. Campbell Benefited From The Settlement 
The settlement agreement provided that the plain-
tiff would reduce his claim by the amount of Ospital's 
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payment ($65f000), and in any event, plaintiff would not 
take judgment against Campbell for any more than Campbell's 
prorata share of negligence. This directly benefited 
Campbell in the following ways: 
(1) The $65f000 reduction of plaintiff's claim 
applied regardless of the extent of Campbell's fault. The 
greater Campbell's fault the more he stood to gain. As it 
turned out, the jury found Campbell 100 percent at fault and 
Campbell received the full benefit of Ospitals payment 
without being exposed to a contribution claim from Ospital 
for the $65,000. (I 78-27-40 t1! U.C.A provides that the 
settling joint tort-feasor cannot pursue a contribution 
claim against another joint tort-feasor whose liability is 
not extinguished by that settlement.) 
(2) Campbell's exposure would be limited to his 
proportionate share of negligence. In other words, he 
would have been severally liable to the plaintiff for the 
whole injury without the settlement even though his negli-
gence would have only been 25 percent of the fault, 
i 78-27-40 C2J U.C.A. Since Ospital was killed in the acci-
dent, and had no assets in his estate (except the automobile 
insurance R. Tr. 502,620), Campbell would have had the risk 
of possibly paying more than his proportionate share of the 
damages, had there been no settlement. 
Clearly, Campbell was not prejudiced by the settle-
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ment between plaintiff and Ospital. Quite the contrary, 
Campbell benefited greatly by Ospitalfs payment of $65,000 
of the liability for which Campbell would otherwise have 
been responsible. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED 
EVIDENCE OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
The foregoing argument makes clear that in this 
case there was no prejudice to Campbell resulting from the 
settlement and subsequent manner in which the trial was con-
ducted. Even if there were some prejudice to Campbell, evi-
dence of settlement would result in prejudice to all 
parties. 
A. Evidence Of Settlement Agreements Is 
Inadmissible At Trial And Would Result In 
Prejudice To All Parties. 
Campbell argues that the trial court should have 
admitted into evidence the Settlement Agreement. Utah has a 
strong policy against admitting evidence of settlement in 
trial, as expressed in Utah Code Ann., i 78-27-30, which 
provides in pertinent part: 
No settlement, partial settlement or voluntary 
payment under section 78-27-29 shall be 
admissible in any action as evidence prior to 
judgment. 
On September 1, 1983, less than two weeks before 
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trial began, Utah courts adopted the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. Rule 408 of the new rules provides in pertinent 
part: 
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or 
promising to furnish or (2) accepting or 
offering or promising to accept, a 
valuable consideration in compromising or 
attempting to compromise a claim which was 
disputed as to either validity or amount, 
is not admissible to prove liability for 
or invalidity of the claim or its amount. 
. . . . This rule also does not require 
exclusion when the evidence is offered for 
another purpose, such as proving bias or 
prejudice of a witness, negativing a con-
tention of undue delay, or proving an 
effort to obstruct a criminal investi-
gation or prosecution. 
In light of these provisions, the trial court 
clearly acted properly and within its discretion in 
excluding the settlement agreement. It has been repeatedly 
held that evidence of a settlement agreement entered into by 
the plaintiff and one of the defendants is inadmissible. 
McHann v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 713 F.2d 161 (5th 
Cir. 1983); Young v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 539 F.Supp. 
193 (E.D.Pa. 1982). 
In Slayton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 A.2d 946 (Vt. 
1981), the court discussed the reasons why admission of a 
settlement agreement is potentially prejudicial to both the 
plaintiff and the non-settling defendant; 
If the jury is informed of either the fact 
or the amount of a settlement, there is a 
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danger that it will draw improper inferen-
ces. A jury might conclude that the 
settling defendant was the party primarily 
responsible for the injury, and that the 
remaining defendant should therefore be 
exonerated. It might take the amount of 
the settlement as a measure of the plain-
tiff's damages. It might consider one 
defendant's settlement to be an admission 
of negligence, and then impute this negli-
gence to a nonsettling defendant. 435 
A. 2d at 947 (citations omitted). 
It was precisely this type of concern—and in 
addition, the prejudice which would have resulted to Ospital 
on his cross-claim—which prompted the trial court to 
exclude evidence of the settlement. The court stated in its 
memorandum decision: 
Cllf the court had allowed the settlement 
agreement as to Ospital and Slusher before 
the jury, this would certainly place the 
jury in a position of looking at the 
agreement as an admission by Ospital of 
negligence and liability. Simply because 
Counsel for Ospital decided to settle 
without admitting liability, this he is 
entitled to do rather than risk possibly a 
larger claim if he didn't settle. But 
this in no way constitutes an admission of 
negligence or liability on the part of 
Todd Ospital and to allow the agreement to 
go before the jury would certainly give 
that impression and would unduly prejudice 
Ospital in his counterclaim. (R. Bk. IV, 
45). 
The prejudice which would have resulted from intro-
ducing evidence of the settlement clearly outweighs any pre-
judice Campbell claims to have resulted from not admitting 
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it. Rule 403f Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that evi-
dence, even though relevant, may be excluded if its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by, among other 
things, "unfair prejudice". See also Bill Currie Ford, 
Inc. v. Cash, 252 So. 2d 407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) 
(Admission of the settlement agreement would perhaps have 
aided the non-settling defendant, but would have prejudiced 
the settling defendant,and was properly excluded. 
A further reason for excluding evidence of the 
settlement is the chilling effect such action would have on 
future settlements. As discussed in Point III of this 
brief, Ospital, or any other settling defendant has to 
remain a party at the trial to litigate the proportionate 
fault between himself and other tort-feasors in order to 
gain protection from the contribution claims. If a court 
must admit the settlement agreement under these circumstan-
ces, the incentive of plaintiffs to settle their claims 
would unquestionably be damaged. This would be directly 
contrary to the policy of this state in favor of settlement. 
Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public Service 
Commission, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983). 
B. Introduction Of The Settlement Agreement Into 
Evidence Would Have Added Little To The Jury's Understanding 
Of The Case And The Relationship Of The Parties. 
In addition to the prejudice which would have 
resulted had the settlement been admitted, there is little 
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or nothing that would have been gained by its admission. 
Campbell fully exploited his opportunity to prove any bias 
Knight might have had in favor of Ospital by questioning him 
on cross-examination as to who retained him and who paid him 
to testify. Knight candidly admitted to the jury that 
Ospital's attorney had made the initial contact with him and 
had provided him with the Investigating Officer's report. 
(T. 387-8). 
Most importantly, counsel for Campbell was allowed 
to argue the alleged collusion between plaintiff and Ospital 
in his closing argument to the jury: 
Now I'd like to get into this case itself 
and some of the facts. Now one fact I 
think you folks probably observed Day 
One, when we had the introduction of the 
witnesses and the opening statements, and 
which carried through all the way to the 
closing argument of Mr. Barrett, is they 
are trying to hang the wrap on Mr. 
Campbell alone, period. Did you hear one 
word where they're talking about what did 
Mr. Ospital do wrong? Uh-uh. Well, 
let's go back a little further and eva-
luate that. 
We were told when we gave a witness list 
that Mr. Knight had been retained by Mr. 
Barrett. We were told by Mr. Knight that 
he hadn't even seen Mr. Barrett until 
right here five minutes before he went on 
the witness stand, that he had been con-
tacted by Mr. Humpherys and given infor-
mation and all this good stuff. You 
know, years ago my grandfather told me 
you could always tell when it was going 
to rain by the direction the wind blew 
and he was right, and in this case, you 
know, the wind blew from the wrong direc-
tion before the rain came, so something 
is wrong. I don't know what their game 
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is. All I can say is I think its very 
obvious to you that this case is lined up 
that "I'll help you and you help me and 
let's stick Campbell". 
Now the question is: does that evidence 
support that? (T. 923-4). 
Since the jury was aware of Ospital's financial 
interest in the outcome by the crossclaim, and since 
Campbell argued the bias of the other parties and the 
apparent collusion between them, little or nothing would be 
gained by the disclosure of the settlement, particularly 
when considering the procedural safeguards provided by the 
court. 
C. The Trial Court Acted Within Its Discretion In 
Excluding The Evidence. 
The trial court has "considerable discretion" in 
ruling on evidentiary matters, Brambrough v. Bethers, 552 
P.2d 1286, 1290 (Utah 1976), and alleged errors will result 
in a new trial only when the error had a substantial effect 
on the outcome of trial. Id.; Rule 103, Utah R. of Evid. 
Rulings on motions for separate trials are similarly 
discretionary. There is no blanket requirement that a 
settlement must be admitted in all cases, as Campbell 
appears to contend. 
In Sequoia Manufacturing Co., Inc., v. Halec 
Construction Co., 117 Ariz. 11, 570 P. 2d 782 (Ariz.App. 
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1977), for example, the non-settling defendant urged, as has 
been urged here, that the settlement agreement lead to 
collusion and resulted in prejudice. The court initially 
noted that the strategies of the settling parties did not 
change as a result of the agreement, and made the following 
observations: 
CWJe believe a trial court is in a unique 
position to view the factors surrounding 
such an agreement and to decide, when 
requested, whether such an agreement should 
be admitted. The record in this case 
reflects the wisdom of such a holding. The 
trial court was aware of all the adverse 
possibilities inherent in the existence of 
the agreement and was fully prepared to 
impose sanctions, if necessary, to prevent 
injustice, up to and including admitting the 
agreement into evidence. After observing 
the conduct of all counsel, their demeanor, 
their witnesses, and the overall atmosphere 
of the courtroom, the trial judge determined 
it unnecessary in this case to disclose the 
agreement to the jury. In an instance such 
as this, we invest the trial court with con-
siderable discretion. We find no abuse of 
discretion. 570 P.2d at 795. 
To similar effect is Vermont Union School District No. 21 v. 
H. P. Cummings Construction Co., 469 A. 2d 742 (Vt. 1983), 
where the court noted that proper measures were taken to 
avoid prejudice and further held that evidence of the 
settlement was properly excluded. The the court explicitly 
directed the trial court not to admit evidence of the 
settlement on remand. 
New trials are granted on the basis of errors in 
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evidentiary rulings only when it "clearly appears that the 
court so abused its discretion that there is a likelihood 
that injustice resulted." State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 
944 (Utah 1982). Under this standard, it is clear that a 
new trial is not warranted in this case. Indeed, the 
following statement of the trial court, which at all times 
was aware of the settlement, alleged collusion and preju-
dice, stated: 
This Court agrees with the jury findings 
and would have so found had there not been 
a jury. The only disagreement the Court 
would have had if he himself would have 
participated in the jury results would be 
that the amount of damages were too small. 
(R. Bk. IV, 44). 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED 
ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO ORDER 
SEPARATE TRIALS 
Campbell strenuously argues that the trial court 
should have bifurcated the trial and made Ospital pursue his 
cross-claim in a separate proceeding. This argument fails 
for several reasons. 
First the Utah Contribution Statute mandates that 
in order for the settling defendant to be protected from 
contribution claims, the issue of proportionate fault must 
be litigated "between joint tort-feasors in the same 
action". Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-43 (2). This statute has 
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recently been interpreted by this court in Madsen v. Salt 
Lake City School Board, 645 P. 2d 658 (Utah 1982). In that 
casef the plaintiffs sought to exclude a third-party defen-
dant, with whom they had settled, from the main action. The 
court held that the "only basis by which plaintiffs could 
relieve the third-party defendants from liability for 
contribution would be under the express provisions of 
§ 78-27-43 . . .." Idk at 663. The court further held that 
"it is imperative that the issue of proportionate fault 
should be litigated between all joint tort-feasors in the 
same action and resolved by the same trier of the issues of 
fact." ^d. at 663. 
Ospital therefore had to be present at trial even 
though plaintiff's claim against Ospital was settled. 
Further, because of this requirement, there can be no preju-
dice or abuse of discretion in allowing Ospital to proceed 
on his cross-claim. It Ospital were required to stay in the 
action, but not pursue his cross-claim, collateral estoppel 
would prevent Ospital from re-litigating the liability 
issue, which would seriously prejudice Ospitalfs cross-
claim. 
Even if it were not required by statute that 
Ospital remain in the trial, the trial court was clearly 
within his discretion in not ordering separate trials. Rule 
42(b), Utah R.Civ.P., provides that "The court in further-
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ance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a 
separate trial . . .." (emphasis added) It is well-
established that this rule sets forth a discretionary stan-
dard. Coleman v. Dillman, 624 P.2d 713 (Utah 1981); S J. 
Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ^42.03 ClJ(2d ed. 1982). 
Professor Moore has stated that "the courts have emphasized 
that separate trials should not be ordered unless such 
disposition is clearly necessary;" and further that: 
A separate trial should not be granted in 
such a case unless the issue is clearly 
severable from the other issues in the case 
and does not involve the same evidence. 
Moore's Federal Practice, ^42-0311]• 
On the issue of liability, the cross-claim against 
Campbell involved the same evidence as the plaintiff's claim 
against Campbell. All of the witnesses, several from out of 
state, were present and ready to testify. A separate trial 
would have required the same witnesses, however, those out 
of state witnesses who were willing to voluntarily appear 
for the plaintiff, may not be willing to appear a second 
time for Ospitals cross-claim. Re-litigating the same issue 
is expensive, inefficient and unjust to all parties with the 
potential for conflicting jury verdicts. Finally, given the 
measures taken by the trial court to prevent prejudice and 
protect the integrity of the proceedings little benefit 
would have been gained by a bifurcation. There was clearly 
no abuse of discretion. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Appellant Campbell 
was given a fair trial and was not prejudiced by any rulings 
of the trial court. Therefore, Respondent Ospital respect-
fully requests that judgment in its favor be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT OSPITAL was mailed, 
postage prepaid, on this /7^day of August, 1984 to: 
Wendell E. Bennett 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
448 East 400 South, Suite 304 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
W. Scott Barrett 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT SLUSHER 
P. 0. Box 465 
Logan, UT 84321 
V ^ L K , JtJtf 
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RELEASE OF CLAIMS 
For and in consideration of the sum of• $65,000.00, 
to me in hand paid by Farmers Insurance Exchange and Allstate 
Insurance Company, Robert G. Slusher, (hereinafter sometimes 
referred to as "Releasor"), hereby releases and forever discharges 
Kenneth W. Brooks, the Estate of Todd Paul Ospital, Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, Allstate Insurance Company, and all of 
their agents, representatives, affiliates, insurers, successors 
and assigns, (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Releasees"), 
from any and all claims losses, demands, damages, actions, causes 
of action or suits of whatever kind or nature, which now exist 
or which may hereafter accrue, because of, for, arising out of, 
or in any way connected with the motor vehicle accident which 
occurred on or about May 22, 1981, in Sardine Canyon, State Road 
91, Cache County, Utah, in which Robert G. Slusher sustained 
personal injuries; the facts, circumstances and details of which 
are more fully set forth in the files and records of the District 
Court of Cache County, State of Utah, in that certain action 
entitled: Robert G. Slusher, plaintiff, vs. Kenneth W. Brooks, 
et al., defendants, Civil No. 19910. 
Robert G. Slusher does not release, but expressly 
preserves any and all claims which he may have against: Curtis 
B. Campbell and/or his-agents and insurers, and any other person 
or entity not released hereunder. .__ ^ 
r ' 
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It is the express intent of the parties hereto to 
relieve Releasees from any liability to make contribution to 
any of the other parties in the above legal action or to any 
other tort feasor or person whomsoever as contemplated by the 
Utah Contribution Among Joint Tort Feasors Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§78-27-39, et. seq. Therefore, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-27-43, Releasor agrees that receipt of the above recited 
consideration and this release reduces any claims which said 
Releasor may have against any of said parties or against any 
such tort feasor, or any person whomsoever, who may otherwise 
be liable to said Releasor as a result of the hereinbefore 
described incident said reduction of liability of such party,-
tort feasor or person to be in the' amount of the consideration 
paid for this release, by Releasees, or to the extent of 
Releasees1 pro rata share, if any, of Releasor's damages recover-
able against all other parties, tort feasors, or other persons, 
if such pro rata share is greater than the consideration paid 
for this release. Releasor expressly waives his right to recover 
from any party, tort feasor or person for the pro rata share of 
Releasor's damages which may be found to have been caused by 
the acts or omissions of Kenneth W. Brooks and Todd Paul 
Ospital. 
It is the express intent of the parties hereto to 
relieve the Releasees from any and all liability for any 
judgment, for indemnity or contribution arising from or pertainin 
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V 
to any claims or damages alleged or set forth in the pleadings 
and documents on file in the above identified lawsuit. Releasor 
therefore agrees not to collect from any party or any other 
person or entity any amount which such party, person or entity 
is legally entitled to collect from Releasees for a judgment, 
for indemnity or contribution on such claims or damages. 
jL DATED this 3 £&" day of June, 1983 
*JJL 
Rober 
i^£, c/?/f3 
/i 
 e t~ G. S lusher 
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